Abstract: We concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in comparing the relationships between di¤erent nonmanipulability notions under these two domains. On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossiness is equivalent to convexity of the range. Thus, minmax rules are the only strategy-proof non-bossy rules. On the single-plateaued domain, only constant rules are non-bossy or Maskin monotonic; but strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness are equivalent to weak Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, strategy-proofness and plateau-invariance guarantee convexity of the range. JEL Classi…cation Number: D71.
Introduction
Theorems 2 and 3). A social choice function is weakly non-bossy (or equivalently, "noncorruptible") if no agent can, by misrepresenting his true preferences, change the social outcome without changing the value of it for himself. As we argue and claim in the Concluding Remarks section, weak non-bossiness could be very helpful to obtain closed characterization results for strategy-proof social choice function on the domain of single-peaked preferences without convex range.
Non-bossiness and a di¤erent weaker version of it have been recently used in Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) to analyze double implementation (that is, implementation in both dominant strategies and Nash equilibria) in a general social choice framework incorporating ours. We call their weaker condition quasi non-bossiness since in our framework, and under strategy-proofness, it is in fact equivalent to our non-bossiness.
With the aim of establishing a relationship between strategy-proofness and a type of à la Maskin condition for social choice functions on single-plateaued preferences in subsection 3.2, we consider two ways of relaxing Maskin monotonicity that we call weak Maskin monotonicity and plateau-invariance. The …rst one weakens the idea of an "improvement" implicit in the very same de…nition of Maskin monotonicity. Plateau-invariance is part of Moulin's (1984) stronguncompromisingness (in particular, his parts (iv) and (v)) and not requiring à la Maskin "improvements" to all the alternatives in the range but only to those that are the most preferred alternatives for some agent.
As previously mentioned, in this paper we show that non-bossiness plays an important role combined with strategy-proofness in the characterization of social choice functions in our framework with single-peaked preferences. Theorem 1 shows that under strategy-proofness, a social choice function on single-peaked preferences is non-bossy if and only if its range is convex. Moreover, it also rea¢ rms the family of minmax rules characterized by Moulin (1980) 1 on a singlepeaked domain as an important class of rules. In particular, these rules are also the unique ones that are non-bossy and strategy-proof.
The result in Theorem 1 does not hold on a single-plateaued domain. As we show in Proposition 1, on a single-plateaued domain only constant rules are non-bossy. We may, however, insist on a non-bossy type concept and move to the weaker concept of weak non-bossiness. Then, we are able to relate strategyproofness and Maskin monotonicity. Theorem 2 shows that on a single-peaked domain a social choice function is strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy if and only if it is Maskin monotonic.
This result does not hold either on the single-plateaued domain. Note that Proposition 1 excludes dictatorial social choice functions, in particular, only constant social choice functions are admissible under Maskin monotonicity. Given Proposition 1 we show that, for single-plateaued preferences, the relation Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness vacuously holds. To obtain a counterpart result to Theorem 2, we use the two proposed ways of relaxing Maskin monotonicity. Theorem 3 shows that on the single-plateaued domain a social choice function is strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy if and only if it is weakly Maskin monotonic. Finally, we explore the second way to relax Maskin monotonicity, called plateau-invariance. In Proposition 2, we show that on a single-plateaued domain any strategy-proof and plateau-invariant social choice function is weakly non-bossy, thus weakly Maskin monotonic by Theorem 3. With the same ‡avour as Theorem 1, part (iii) in Proposition 2 guarantees the convexity of the range of any strategy-proof and plateau-invariant rule on single-plateaued preferences.
Related Literature
Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) show that Maskin monotonicity and strategyproofness are equivalent when preferences are the unrestricted strict domain. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) obtain strategy-proofness as a necessary condition for Maskin monotonicity for their rich domains.
2 There are interesting papers in the literature analyzing the relationship among strategyproofness, Maskin monotonicity, and/or non-bossiness. 3 However, as far as we know, only three works deserve our attention concerning the relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity that embed or directly analyze the problem of the provision of only public goods. Shenker (1993) studies the relationship between our three strategic axioms when agents'preferences are monotonically closed in a model dealing simultaneously with both the public and the private goods case. However, his non-bossiness condition is Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) 's one and thus it is trivially satis…ed when analyzing economies with only public goods. As said above we consider an alternative de…nition that has some bite for public goods.
Another paper closely related to ours is due to Takamiya (2007) . He considers the same framework as ours and de…nes two su¢ cient conditions that a domain of a social choice function should satisfy to have the property that coalition strategy-proofness implies Maskin monotonicity and its converse. Our results are independent from his since the domain of single-peaked preferences does not satisfy any of his domain conditions. Moreover, the domain of single-plateaued preferences satis…es only one of his conditions, the one required by Takamiya to establish that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. However, we will see that this relationship is vacuous since Maskin monotonicity is very demanding applied to our framework with single-plateaued preferences.
Recently, Bochet and Klaus (2008) have analyzed the relationship between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness in a general model that covers both the private goods and the public goods setup. Like Takamiya (2007) they introduce two su¢ cient conditions that a domain of a social choice function should satisfy to guarantee that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness and the converse. Observe that neither single-plateaued nor single-peaked preferences satisfy their condition to guarantee that strategy-proofness implies Maskin monotonicity. However, both domains satisfy their condition to guarantee that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. For single-peaked preferences, we independently state this result (see part of one implication of Theorem 2). As mentioned above, for single-plateaued preferences, we show that this relation is vacuous and trivially holds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model and de…ni-tions while Section 3 encompasses the main results. A summary of the results, proposals for further research, and some comments form the Concluding Remarks section (Section 4). We gather the proofs of all results in Section 5.
The basic model and de…nitions
Let A = [0; 1] be the set of alternatives 4 that stand for the feasible levels of a public good, and N = f1; 2; :::; ng be the set of agents (with n > 2) in the society. Let capital letters S; T N denote subsets of agents while small letters s; t their cardinality.
Let D denote the set of admissible preferences for each agent, that will be a subset of continuous and convex preferences on A. Although we restrict to ordinal preferences, we use utility functions to denote them. A preference pro…le is denoted by u = (u 1 ; :::; u n ) 2 D n or also by u = (u S ; u S ) 2 D n when we want to stress the role of a coalition S N , and then u S 2 D s and u S 2 D n s denote the preferences of agents in S and in N nS, respectively. In each de…nition, D will refer to either one of the following domains: the set of single-plateaued preferences (denoted by F) or else the set of single-peaked preferences (denoted by S). That is, each property will be de…ned for two di¤erent domains: F and S.
We now de…ne a single-plateaued preference for any agent i 2 N .
4 All of our proofs can be easily adapted for a …nite set of alternatives and for R.
4 y 2 Ag, and for any y; z 2 A such that y < z 6 p (u i ), or p
The set of best alternatives for agent i according to
, is denoted by (u i ) and called the plateau of u i . The domain of single-peaked preferences, denoted by S, is a subdomain of F for which the plateau of a preference u i is a singleton called the peak,
For some u i 2 D and for some
if it exists and r ui (x) = 1 (respectively, 0) otherwise. Note that when r ui (x) exists it is unique since single-plateaued preferences do not allow for indi¤erence between alternatives in the same side of the plateau.
A social choice function (or also a rule) on D n is a function f :
The most well-known nonmanipulability property is strategy-proofness. Strategyproofness requires that the truth be a dominant strategy and it is a necessary condition for implementation in dominant strategies (Gibbard, 1973) . Strategyproofness assures that the rule will be immune to unilateral strategic behavior.
De…nition 2 A social choice function f on D n is strategy-proof if for any u 2 D n , any i 2 N and any
It is worth mentioning that if f is strategy-proof on D n then A f is closed (see Step 1 of Theorem 2's proof in Zhou, 1991 and Lemma 1 in Barberà and Jackson, 1994) .
Another well-known condition in implementation theory is Maskin monotonicity, a necessary condition for Nash implementation (see Maskin, 1977) . A social choice function is said to be Maskin monotonic if the outcome to be chosen by the function does not vary whenever each individual switches his preference keeping or improving the relative ranking of that outcome.
De…nition 3 A social choice function f on D n is Maskin monotonic if for any u 2 D n , for any i 2 N , and
Another property on rules related to the strategic behavior of agents is nonbossiness. The usual notion of non-bossiness introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) is trivially satis…ed for any social choice function in economic environments with only public goods. We use the notion of non-bossiness, recently used by Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) , and stronger than the one introduced by Ritz (1985) and called "noncorruptability", that has some bite for public goods. Mainly, a non-bossy social choice function is a rule for which 5 An alternative de…nition more appropriate to work with weaker versions of Maskin monotonicity is as follows. We say that f satis…es Maskin monotonicity if and only if 
We say that an agent can boss another agent around if, by changing her announced utility, she can change the social outcome without changing her own utility.
6
Two di¤erent natural weaker versions of non-bossiness can be considered. None of them have been analyzed a lot in the literature of only public goods. Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) considered quasi non-bossiness 7 that, joint with strategy-proofness, assures in their general framework the possibility of dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. Weak non-bossiness was originally de…ned by Ritz (1985) as "noncorruptability" in a work where he studies the relationship between Arrow social welfare functions and social choice correspondences. Below, we formally de…ne both properties.
De…nition 5 A social choice function f on D n is quasi non-bossy if for any i 2 N , for any u i ; v i 2 D, and
That is, we say that an agent is quasi a boss if, by changing her announced utility, she can change the social outcome without changing her own utility under both his original preferences independently of others'preferences.
De…nition 6 A social choice function f on D n is weakly non-bossy if for any i 2 N , for any u i ; v i 2 D, and
Mainly, an agent can weakly boss another agent around if, by changing her announced utility, she can change the social outcome without changing her own utility under both his original and …nal preferences.
Non-bossiness implies both weak non-bossiness and quasi non-bossiness by de…nition. However, the converse does not hold in our framework: neither weak non-bossiness nor quasi non-bossiness imply non-bossiness. For both singlepeaked and single-plateaued preferences, consider the rule de…ned in Example 2 below (see the details in the example).
A natural question refers to establishing in our framework a relationship between weak non-bossiness and quasi non-bossiness. It is worth mentioning that 6 We could have adapted other existing formulations of non-bossiness for economies with private goods. For example, instead of requiring that f (u) be equal to f (v i ; u i ), we could require that f (u) be indi¤erent to f (v i ; u i ) for all agents. Obviously this makes the condition weaker. However, it is easy to check that on S n and F n under strategy-proofness both nonbossy conditions are equivalent and we can use them indistinctly. 7 The authors call it weak non-bossiness. See also Mizukami and Wakayama (2007a) . 6 in general these two properties are not related: In Example 6 we present a weakly non-bossy rule violating both quasi non-bossiness and strategy-proofness. We can also construct examples of quasi non-bossy rules violating both weak nonbossiness and strategy-proofness 8 . However, as we will see below as a consequence of Lemma 2 in the Appendix and part (iv) of Theorem 1 in Section 3, under strategy-proofness, quasi non-bossiness and non-bossiness are equivalent while weak non-bossiness is strictly weaker than non-bossiness.
With the aim of establishing a relationship between strategy-proofness and a type of à la Maskin condition for social choice functions on F n in subsection 3.2, we consider two ways of relaxing Maskin monotonicity that we call weak Maskin monotonicity and plateau-invariance. One weakens the idea of an "improvement" implicit in the very same de…nition of Maskin monotonicity. The other one, not requiring à la Maskin "improvements" to all the alternatives in the range but only to those that are the most preferred alternatives for some agent.
We say that x improves à la Maskin with respect to y for agent i when moving from
Note that a Maskin monotonic social choice function requires that for any alternative in the range, say f (u), improving with respect to any other alternative for all agent when moving from u i to v i , then the outcome does not change.
We say that x strictly improves with respect to y for agent i when moving
With these ideas in mind we present our two properties related to Maskin monotonicity. We say that a social choice function is weakly Maskin monotonic if the outcome to be chosen by the function does not vary whenever each individual switches his preference keeping or strictly improving the relative ranking of that outcome.
Observe that Maskin monotonicity implies weak Maskin monotonicity by de…nition. Moreover, weak Maskin monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity on single-peaked preferences (see Lemma 1 below) but not on single-plateaued ones (see the Concluding Remarks section).
Lemma 1 Any weakly Maskin monotonic social choice function on S
n is Maskin monotonic.
The second condition that we call plateau-invariance was part of Moulin's (1984) strong-uncompromisingness (in particular, his parts (iv) and (v)). In his Lemma 5, Moulin (1984) shows that his Generalized Condorcet winner choice functions satisfy plateau-invariance.
De…nition 8 A social choice function f on D n is plateau-invariant if for any i 2 N and u i 2 D n 1 , the following holds:
Note that for our two domains, strategy-proofness implies the second part of the de…nition of plateau-invariance. Moreover, for single-peakedness, part (1) does not apply and part (2) is implied by peak-onlyness. Thus, strategyproofness implies plateau-invariance on S n but the converse does not hold (see Example 6 below). For single-plateaued preferences, neither strategy-proofness implies plateau-invariance nor the converse (see the following examples).
Example 1 Let n 2. Then, for any u 2 F n , de…ne the social choice function f as follows:
Observe that f is strategy-proof but it does not satisfy plateau-invariance. To show the failness of the last condition, let u 2 F n such that (u j ) = [
It is also interesting to observe that f has a convex range and it satis…es weak non-bossiness.
. This social choice function satis…es plateau-invariance and weak non-bossiness (note that it also satis…es quasi non-bossiness). However, since f is manipulable, by Theorem 3 below, f does not satisfy weak Maskin monotonicity. To show that manipulations by single agents exist, suppose that = 3 8 and let u 2 F n such that p(u 1 ) = p(u 2 ) = 0, and u 3 such that (u 3 ) = [
Observe that agent 3 manipulates f at u via v 3 . This example can be easily adapted and de…ned for single-peaked preferences. The same conditions hold and are violated, and similar pro…les work to show manipulation by single agents. Note that non-bossiness does not hold either: Let u 2 S n such that p(u 1 ) = p(u 2 ) = 0, and u 3 such that p(u 3 ) = 1 2
+ "(u 3 ). Note that we can impose that and r u 3 ( "(u 3 )) = + "(v 3 ). Then, non-bossiness is violated.
By means of these two previous examples, we can also show that neither weak Maskin monotonicity implies plateau-invariance nor the converse on F n . The idea is that while weak Maskin monotonicity requires a strict improvement for all alternatives in the range, plateau-invariance alternatively requires an improvement but only for some subset of alternatives in the range.
Main Results
Along the paper we are interested in establishing the relationship between strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness, and the variations of them de…ned in Section 1: quasi non-bossiness, weak non-bossiness, weak Maskin monotonicity and plateau-invariance. In particular, we ask whether there are relationships between them and whether these relationships rely on the preference domains under study (F or S). We …rst consider the singlepeaked domain and then we analyze the single-plateaued one.
Single-peaked preferences
For the case of single-peaked preferences, there exist lots of rules simultaneously satisfying our three main strategic requirements. See the following very wellknown example.
Example 3 Let n 3 be odd. Then, for any u 2 S n , de…ne the social choice function f as follows:
The median voter rule is strategy-proof (see Moulin, 1980) . It is easy to check that f also satis…es non-bossiness and Maskin monotonicity.
First observe that although there exist rules satisfying all the properties, any couple of them may be logically independent. What we do in this subsection is to obtain for S n the exact relationship between our three basic strategic requirements.
By means of Examples 4 and 5 below, observe that for social choice functions on S n neither strategy-proofness nor Maskin monotonicity alone imply nonbossiness, nor the converse. However, non-bossiness turns out to be crucial as a complement to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences.
Example 4 Let a; b 2 A, a < b, and n 2. Then, for any u 2 S n , de…ne the social choice function f as follows:
Observe that f is strategy-proof and it satis…es Maskin monotonicity. However it is not non-bossy. Suppose that n is odd (a similar example could be obtained for n even). Let u 2 S n be such that for n 1 2 agents (say, set S 0 ), p(u j ) = 0, for n 1 2 agents p(u j ) = 1 (say, set S 1 ), and for the last agent (say, agent 1)
Using the same preferences we can show that f violates quasi non-bossiness.
Example 5 Let a; b 2 A, a 6 = 0, a < b, and n 2. Then, for any u 2 S n , de…ne the social choice function f as follows:
Note that f is non-bossy however it is manipulable and it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. To show that strategy-proofness fails, consider
Note that the range of the social choice functions in the previous examples is not convex. That the range of a social choice function be a closed interval has happened to be quite important in the characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions on the single-peaked domain (see Moulin, 1980 , Ching, 1998 , and Sprumont, 1995 . From the above examples, one could think that there should be a close relationship between convexity of the range and non-bossiness under strategy-proofness. In fact, as shown in Theorem 1, under strategyproofness, convexity of the range and non-bossiness are equivalent. The next theorem however tells us much more.
Let us …rst de…ne the relevant and well-known class of minmax rules for which we present an alternative characterization result.
De…nition 9 A social choice function f is a minmax rule if there exist a list of parameters (a S ) S N 2 A 2 n satisfying that for any S; T N , S T , then a S a T and for any u 2 S n ,
The class of minmax rules is equivalent to the class of augmented median voter rules due to Ching (1998) and the class of generalized median voter schemes de…ned for one good as in Barberà, Gul, and Stachetti (1993) .
Theorem 1 Let f be a strategy-proof social choice function on S n . Then the following statements are equivalent: (i) f is non-bossy, (ii) f is quasi non-bossy, (iii) f is a minmax rule, (iv) f has a convex range.
To illustrate the relevance of the result in Theorem 1, observe …rst (as illustrated in Example 4) that strategy-proofness implies neither non-bossiness, nor quasi non-bossiness, nor convexity of the range. Second, note that at the light of Theorem 2.4 in Sprumont (1995) (which uses Ching's characterization result and convexity of the range), we can establish the characterization result of the well-known class of minmax rules using non-bossiness (or equivalently, quasi non-bossiness) instead of other well-known requirements such as peak-onlyness (used in Moulin, 1980) . Alternatively, on S n and under strategy-proofness, quasi non-bossiness, nonbossiness, and also convexity of the range are equivalent. Moreover, the class of minmax rules are the only strategy-proof rules with convex range.
It is worth mentioning that the result in Theorem 1 does not hold relaxing non-bossiness with weak non-bossiness. Observe that the rule de…ned in Example 4 satis…es weak non-bossiness and strategy-proofness but it does not have a convex range.
A natural question that arises is if strategy-proofness can be replaced by Maskin monotonicity in Theorem 1. To answer this question let us …rst analyze the relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity for social choice functions on S n . We will show below that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness but the converse does not hold. As it is illustrated by means of Example 4, there exist social choice functions on S n that are strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy (the latter is straightforward by de…nition), that additionally satisfy Maskin monotonicity. As we show in the following statement, the relationship between strategy-proofness joint with weak non-bossiness with respect to Maskin monotonicity stated in the social choice function presented in Example 4 is not a particular feature of that rule.
Theorem 2 A social choice function f on S n is strategy-proof and weakly nonbossy if and only if f is Maskin monotonic.
Among the previous literature, other papers have also established the relationship between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness. We now discuss some of them in order to clarify the relevance of the previous result. The classical result by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) asserts that on the unrestricted strict preference domain, a social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (also called in the literature strong positive association). Barberà and Peleg (1990) in the framework with a metric space as set of alternatives and preferences being continuous utility functions showed that strategy-proofness does not imply Maskin monotonicity. However, a weaker version of it, which they call modi…ed strong positive association, is necessary though not su¢ cient for strategy-proofness (see their Lemma 4.8). Another existing result goes in the other direction. That is, strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for Maskin monotonicity. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) considered a general set of alternatives and "rich" domains and they obtain strategy-proofness as a necessary condition for Maskin monotonicity.
In our framework, by Theorem 2 above, on S n Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. However, the converse does not hold as Example 7 below illustrates. With single-peaked preferences, Maskin monotonicity and strategyproofness are equivalent under weak non-bossiness. Note that to show the relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity in Theorem 2 we can not use the results stated in Takamiya (2007) and in Bochet and Klaus (2008) . The authors consider frameworks encompassing ours and de…ne two su¢ cient conditions that a domain of a social choice function should satisfy to have the property that strategy-proofness (in fact, coalition strategy-proofness in Takamiya, 2007) implies Maskin monotonicity and its converse. However, one can check that the domain of single-peaked preferences satis…es neither Takamiya's condition A nor condition B. Concerning Bochet and Klaus (2008) , the domain of single-peaked preferences satis…es only their condition R1 that assures that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. Independently of their result, we also establish such relationship as part of our Theorem 2.
It is also interesting to observe that the result in Theorem 2 is tight. Or equivalently, as we show in the following examples, strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness are also independent properties of social choice functions in our framework.
Example 6 Let a 2 A and n 2. Then, for any u 2 S n de…ne f as follows:
Observe that f is weakly non-bossy, but it is not strategy-proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that a = 
It is worth noting that f violates quasi non-bossiness.
10 Let i = 1, u 1 2 S as above and w 1 2 S such that p(w 1 ) = 1 2 : By de…nition of f , for any w 1 2 S n 1 ; f (u 1 ; w 1 ) = 1 4 which di¤ ers from f (w 1 ; w 1 ) = 1 2 ; however, u 1 (f (u 1 ; w 1 )) = u 1 (f (w 1 ; w 1 )):
Example 7 Let a; b 2 A, a < b, n 2. Then, for any u 2 S n , de…ne f as follows:
Observe that f is strategy-proof. However it is not weakly non-bossy. Suppose that n is odd (a similar example could be obtained for n even). Let u 2 S n be such that for any agent i 2 N ,
for j 2 S 0 N nf1g, being S 0 a set of n 1 2 agents, and p(u k ) > a+b 2 for k 2 S 1 = N n (S 0 [ f1g) being S 1 a set of n 1 2 agents. Consider also v 1 2 S such that v 1 (a) = v 1 (b) but p(v 1 ) > a+b 2 . Therefore, f (u) = a and f (v 1 ; u 1 ) = b. Note that u 1 (f (u)) = u 1 (f (v 1 ; u 1 ) ) and v 1 (f (v 1 ; u 1 )) = v 1 (f (u)) but f (u) 6 = f (v 1 ; u 1 ) which means that weakly non-bossy is violated. The same pro…les show that f violates Maskin monotonicity. Note that L(
Before going to the next subsection where the relationships between our strategic requirements for F n are studied, note that Theorem 2 allows us to state that strategy-proofness can be replaced by Maskin monotonicity in Theorem 1.
Single-plateaued preferences
The statement we did for single-peakedness about "the existence of lots of rules simultaneously satisfying our three main strategic requirements" is completely false for the case of single-plateaued preferences. Although we can obtain lots of examples of strategy-proof rules (see Berga, 1998) it is impossible to …nd nonconstant social choice functions satisfying either one of the other two strategic requirements: non-bossiness or Maskin monotonicity. Furthermore, it is also impossible to match strategy-proofness and quasi non-bossiness unless we get constant rules. Such kind of impossibility results are embedded in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There is no social choice function f on F n with #A f > 2 if one of the following statements holds: (i) f is non-bossy, (ii) f is Maskin monotonic, (iii) f is strategy-proof and quasi non-bossy.
Note that Proposition 1 excludes dictatorial social choice functions, in particular, only constant social choice functions are compatible with either Maskin monotonicity, or non-bossiness, or else strategy-proofness joint with quasi nonbossiness. The result in part (ii) can be also obtained as a corollary to Saijo (1987) 's Theorem. In that paper, Saijo analyzes the relationship between Maskin monotonicity and the constancy of a rule in a more general framework that encompasses ours. In particular, he uses a condition on A f called "dual dominance" that any social choice function must satisfy to guarantee that the only Maskin monotonic rules are constant ones. 11 The proof of part (ii) of Proposition 1 is essentially identical to Saijo's one. We incorporate it in the Appendix for sake of completeness. A similar conclusion is obtained in Bochet and Klaus (2008) .
Note that, like for S n , weak non-bossiness is strictly weaker than nonbossiness under strategy-proofness with single-plateaued preferences. By Proposition 1 above, only constant rules are non-bossy while there exist non-constant rules satisfying strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness, for instance the rule presented in Example 1.
Concerning the relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity, again, observe on the one hand that Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) 's equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness does not hold for F n (there exist lots of non-constant strategy-proof rules on F n while only constant ones are Maskin monotonic). On the other hand, note that we can not use the results stated in Takamiya (2007) and in Bochet and Klaus (2008) . We can check that the domain of single-plateaued preferences satis…es only condition B (not condition A) in Takamiya's Theorem 2 and only condition R1 (not condition R2) in Bochet and Klaus'Theorem 1 to establish that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. Thus, by statement (ii) in Proposition 1 above, the results stated in Theorem 2 in Takamiya (2007) and in Theorem 1 in Bochet and Klaus (2008) are completely vacuous and trivially satis…ed when applied to single-plateaued preferences.
Given the impossibility results in Proposition 1 if we are interested in establishing a relationship between strategy-proofness, a kind of à la non-bossy condition, and/or a kind of à la Maskin monotonicity condition, we should concentrate on weaker versions of them. Concretely, we use weak non-bossiness and weak Maskin monotonicity or plateau-invariance, respectively.
Below we state the counterpart result to Theorem 2 for the single-plateaued domain.
Theorem 3 A social choice function f on F n is strategy-proof and weakly nonbossy if and only if f is weakly Maskin monotonic.
By Proposition 1, we can not replace weak Maskin monotonicity by Maskin monotonicity in Theorem 3: the rule in Example 1 is strategy-proof, weakly nonbossy but it is not constant. Moreover, note that the result stated in Theorem 3 is tight. See Example 2 and replicate Example 7 above for single-plateaued preferences to show the independence of strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness. Now we are interested in studying the power that plateau-invariance joint with strategy-proofness give to social choice functions on F n . As we see by means of the following result, these two conditions imply weak non-bossiness, weak Maskin monotonicity, and also convexity of the range. Plateau-invariance is very powerful. It allows us to state clear relationships between strategyproofness and both the weaker versions of non-bossiness and weak Maskin monotonicity.
Proposition 2 Let f be a strategy-proof and plateau-invariant social choice function on F n . Then, (i) f is weakly non-bossy, (ii) f is weakly Maskin monotonic, and (iii) f has a convex range.
Note that the converse of these three results do not hold. Concretely, observe …rst that we can not adapt Theorem 1 for single-plateaued preferences using weak non-bossiness (see the Concluding Remarks section). However, one could think that plateau-invariance would help to obtain that counterpart result; that is, that under strategy-proofness, plateau-invariance and convex range are equivalent. Note that Proposition 2 tells us that this is not true either and Example 1 above presents a strategy-proof rule on F n with convex range but violating plateau-invariance.
Second, observe that under strategy-proofness, plateau-invariance is equivalent to neither weak non-bossiness nor to weak Maskin monotonicity. Example 8 presents a strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy, and thus, weakly Maskin monotonic social choice function that violates plateau-invariance.
Example 8 Let a; b 2 A, and a < b, n 2. Then, for any u 2 F n , de…ne f as follows:
, and b otherwise.
Observe that f is strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy (thus, weakly Maskin monotonic). However the range is not convex. Observe also that f is not plateau-invariant. Let u 1 2 F be such that p (u 1 ) > a and p + (u 1 ) = b and v 1 2 F be such that (v 1 ) = [a; b]. Let u 1 2 F n 1 . Therefore, f (u) = b and f (v 1 ; u 1 ) = a, which contradicts part (1) in the de…nition of plateau-invariance.
Concluding Remarks
To conclude we …rst summarize our main results and mention some questions for further research. In the framework of the provision of a single pure public good with single-peaked or single-plateaued preferences, we establish the equivalence between strategy-proofness joint with weak non-bossiness and weak Maskin monotonicity (see Theorems 2 and 3). For single-peakedness, we can go further and we obtain the well-known class of minmax rules as the unique strategy-proof rules satisfying non-bossiness (see Theorem 1). We also show that strategy-proofness can be replaced by Maskin monotonicity. For singleplateaued preferences, we obtain constant rules as the unique ones satisfying either Maskin monotonicity, or non-bossiness, or else strategy-proofness and quasi non-bossiness (see Proposition 1). We also identify a condition called plateauinvariance that joint with strategy-proofness guarantees convexity of the range (see Proposition 2). Note that the unique result valid for both domains is the one in Theorem 3.
12 Note also that all our proofs can be adequately adapted to show that our results, except the one related to the characterization in part (iii) of Theorem 1, hold whenever we consider weakly single-peaked or else weakly single-plateaued preferences.
13 Roughly speaking, weakly refers to allowing for indi¤erence in the same side of the peak or the plateau. Cantala (2004) analyzes the particular subclass of weakly single-peaked preferences where one plateau at the lowest feasible level of utility is considered in both sides of the peak. He obtains the extreme minmax rules (a subclass of minmax rules whose outcome is always an agent's peak) as the unique strategy-proof and e¢ cient rules. Note that with weakly single-peaked preferences, the class of strategy-proof rules with convex range (since we can show peak-onlyness) could be a strict subset of the class of minmax rules, not necessarily all.
Given the results in Theorems 1 and 2, a natural further research work is to obtain the characterization class of all strategy-proof and weakly nonbossy rules on S n . As Theorem 1 indicates the relaxation from non-bossy to weakly non-bossy includes rules with non-convex range as part of the expected characterization class. We already know that the class of strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy rules must be a subclass of Barberà and Jackson (1994) 's rules.
As we have seen, non-bossiness turns out to be crucial in the characterization of strategy-proof rules with convex range for single-peakedness. Note also that on single-peaked preferences there does not exist a closed characterization of strategy-proof rules with non convex range. Barberà and Jackson (1994) obtain a characterization via a class of tie-breaking rules. However, neither in the single-peaked nor in the single-plateaued preferences domain, weak nonbossiness guarantees convex range. As we show in part (iii) of Proposition 2, strategy-proofness joint with plateau-invariance assures convexity of the range for single-plateuedness. Thus, one can think that plateau-invariance opens a possibility to obtain a closed characterization result in the line of those obtained for single-peakedness but for the case of plateaux.
Finally, we present some implementation results straightforwardly obtained combining the results in our paper with the ones in Saijo, Sjöstrom, and Yamato (2007) . These authors state that (i) a social choice function is dominant strategy implemented by its associated direct mechanism if and only if it satis…es strategy-proofness and quasi non-bossiness, (ii) a social choice function is securely implementable if and only if it satis…es strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and the outcome rectangular property. These results together with the results of our paper provide the following:
An alternative characterization of minmax rules for single-peakedness: "A social choice function on the single-peaked domain is dominant strategy implemented by its associated direct revelation mechanism if and only if it is a minmax rule.".
A social choice function on the single-plateaued domain is securely implementable if and only if it is constant.
A social choice function on the single-plateaued domain is dominant strategy implemented by its associated direct revelation mechanism (or alternatively, Nash implementable) if and only if it is constant. Saijo, Sjöstrom, and Yamato (2007) also show that if a social choice function on the single-peaked domain is securely implementable, then there is a dictator on the range of the social choice function.
The kind of indi¤erences existing in both domains is the reason why we obtain such di¤erences between the two domains concerning the existence of nonconstant rules and either securely, or Nash implementable, or dominant strategy implementable via its direct revelation mechanism. Under single-peakedness, indi¤erence classes may consist of at most two alternatives. In the case of single-plateaued preferences, the set of best alternatives contains more than one alternative. Yet, weakening the notion of single peakedness to allow for indifferences, even in the set of best alternatives, is a delicate matter because it may destroy all regularities. In particular, in our framework there exist non-constant rules that are either non-bossy or Maskin monotonic on the single-peaked domain while only constant rules are either non-bossy or Maskin monotonic for the single-plateaued one.
Proofs
We devote this section to the proofs of all results. We start showing the equivalence between weak Maskin and Maskin monotonicity for single-peaked preferences.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let f be a weakly Maskin monotonic social choice function on S n . Let u 2 S n and
. To show that Maskin monotonicity holds, we must obtain that f (v i ; u i ) = f (u). Without loss of generality, suppose that p(u i ) f (u). Note that on S n , this fact joint with condition B imply that
. Thus, it is trivial to see that the following two conditions hold: (i) for any x 2 A such that u i (f (u)) = u i (x) then it also holds that v i (f (u)) v i (x) and (ii) for any x 2 A such that u i (f (u)) > u i (x) then it also holds that v i (f (u)) > v i (x). Thus, conditions of weak Maskin monotonicity holds and thus f (v i ; u i ) = f (u) which ends the proof.
Let us now prove the main results, all presented in Section 3. First, we show Theorem 1, that is, the equivalence of non-bossiness, convex range, and quasi non-bossiness under strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences. We need the de…nition of uncompromisingness …rst introduced by Border and Jordan (1983) .
De…nition 10 We say that f satis…es uncompromisingness if the following holds: Pick any u 2 D n and set f (u) = z. For all j 2 N and all v j 2 D, we have f (v j ; u j ) = f (u) if either z < p (u j ) and z p (v j ), or else z > p + (u j ) and z p + (v j ).
To show the equivalence between quasi non-bossiness and convex range for single-peaked preferences we need the following intermediate result that also holds for single-plateaued preferences. It says that strategy-proofness and quasi non-bossiness impose some additional property on f (say, Property L) which is, in fact, stronger than Maskin monotonicity by de…nition.
Lemma 2 If a social choice function f on D n is strategy-proof and quasi nonbossy then the following property (say, Property L) holds:
"For all
Proof of Lemma 2. Let f be a strategy-proof and quasi non-bossy social choice function. Let
Note that by strategy-proofness,
Proof of Theorem 1.
We proceed showing the two following if and only if relationships: (i) f is non-bossy() (iv) f has convex range and (ii) f is quasi non-bossy () (iv) f has convex range. Note that the relationship (iii) f is a minmax rule () (iv) f has convex range, has been already stated in the literature (see Theorem 2.4 in Sprumont, 1995). (i) () (iv) Let f be a strategy-proof social choice function on S n . We …rst show that if f is non-bossy then it has convex range. By contradiction suppose that there exist x; y 2 A f , x < y, such that (x; y) AnA f . Let u; v 2 S n such that f (u) = x and f (v) = y. Let w i 2 S be such that p(w i ) 2 (f (u); f (v)) and w i (f (u)) = w i (f (v)). Under u we distinguish three type of agents,
Case 3. If any k 2 N 3 announces w k , by strategy-proofness at (w N 1 ; w N 2 ; w k ; u N 3 nfkg ), f (w N 1 ; w N 2 ; w k ; u N 3 nfkg ) 2 ff (u); f (v)g. Suppose to get a contradiction that f (w N 1 ; w N 2 ; w k ; u N 3 nfkg ) = f (v). By non-bossiness, we obtain that f (w N 1 ; w N 2 ; u N 3 ) = f (w N 1 ; w N 2 ; w k ; u N 3 nfkg ) = f (v), contradicting that f (u) 6 = f (v). Therefore f (w N 1 ; w N 2 ; w k ; u N 3 nfkg ) = f (u) and f (w N 1 ; w N 2 ; w N 3 ) = f (w) = f (u). Beginning from v, and from a similar argument than before we get that f (w) = f (v) and we get the desired contradiction.
We now show that if f has convex range then it is non-bossy. By contradiction suppose that there exist i, u i , v i 2 S and u i 2 S n 1 such that f (u) 6 = f (v i ; u i ), and u i (f (u)) = u i (f (v i ; u i )). Suppose without loss of generality that f (u) < f (v i ; u i ). Observe …rst that f (u) and f (v i ; u i ) are di¤er-ent from p(u i ). By single-peakedness, p(u i ) 2 (f (u); f (v i ; u i )). By strategyproofness, p(v i ) > f (u). By Lemma 2.1 in Sprumont (1995), we have that f is peak-only. Then, his Fact 2 and peak-onlyness imply uncompromisingness of f . Thus, it is straightforward to show that f (v i ; u i ) = f (u) and we get a contradiction.
(ii) () (iv) Let f be a strategy proof and quasi non-bossy social choice function. By contradiction, suppose that A f is not convex. Then, there exist
Since f is strategy proof, we have that it is unanimous on the range. Therefore, f (u 1 ; u 2 ; ::; u n ) = a, and f (w 1 ; w 2 ; ::; w n ) = b. Beginning from u and changing one individual each time we have from Lemma 2 that f (v 1 ; v 2 ; ::; v n ) = a. Beginning from w and changing one individual each time we have from Lemma 2 that f (v 1 ; v 2 ; ::; v n ) = b. We get a contradiction with f being a social choice function. The converse, that is, that any strategy-proof rule with convex range is quasi non-bossy, is straightforward by the implication (iv) ) (i) shown above. If f is strategy-proof and has convex range is non-bossy and thus quasi non-bossy (by de…nition).
Second, we show that Maskin monotonicity is strictly stronger than strategyproofness on S n . Moreover, they are equivalent adding weak non-bossiness.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Let …rst show that any Maskin monotonic social choice function f on S n is strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy. Suppose …rst that f is not weakly non-bossy. Then there exist u i ; v i 2 S, and
, and by Maskin monotonicity f (u) = f (v i ; u i ), which is a contradiction. Suppose now that f is not strategy-proof. Then there exist i 2 N , u i ; v i 2 S, and u i 2 S n 1 , such that
) and we get a contradiction to the fact that f (v i ; u i ) 6 = f (u). Now, we show that any strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy social choice function is Maskin monotonic. Suppose not. Then there exist u 2 S n , i 2 N , and
. By strategyproofness, f (v i ; u i ) = f (u) which is the desired contradiction. Now suppose that f (u) > p(u i ). By strategy-proofness,
. In order that condition B holds, r vi (f (u)) r ui (f (u)) (say I2) and thus p(v i ) < r ui (f (u)). If one of the two inequalities (I1) and (I2) hold strictly, that is, if either r ui (f (u)) < f (v i ; u i ) or else r vi (f (u)) < r ui (f (u)), then we get a contradiction to strategy-proofness since we have that
, by weak nonbossiness we obtain that f (v i ; u i ) = f (u) which is the desired contradiction.
Previously to the proof of Proposition 1, we need to introduce the well-known notion of an option set and an intermediate result stated in Claim 1 below.
De…nition 11 Let f be a social choice function on D n . The option set of coalition S at u N nS is the set
Claim 1 Let f be a non-bossy social choice function on F n with #A f 2. Then, (i) o(u i ) is a singleton for any i 2 N and u i 2 F n 1 . Moreover, (ii) o(u i ) is also a singleton for any i 2 N and u i 2 F.
Proof of Claim 1. Let f be a non-bossy social choice function on F n with #A f 2. First, we show part (i) by contradiction. Consider i 2 N and u i 2 F n 1 …xed. By contradiction, suppose that o(u i ) is not a singleton. Let u i , v i 2 F such that f (u i ; u i ) = x and f (v i ; u i ) = y where x 6 = y. Let ! i 2 F such that (! i ) = A. By non-bossiness, f (! i ; u i ) = x and f (! i ; u i ) = y which is the desired contradiction. To show part (ii), let i 2 N , u i 2 F, and y 2 o(u i ). Let u i 2 F n 1 such that f (u i ; u i ) = y. Consider any v i 2 F n 1 . We must show that f (u i ; v i ) = y. We will do it changing one by one agents' preferences from u i to v i and applying n 1 times part (i) of this claim. Let j 6 = i, u j 2 F n 1 , by part (i) of this claim, f (v j ; u j ) = y. Let k 6 = fi; jg and let u k = (v j ; u fk;jg ). Applying part (i) again we obtain that f (v j ; v k ; u fj;kg ) = y. Repeating this argument we get that f (u i ; v i ) = y.
Claim 1 is crucial in the proof of part (i) in Proposition 1, that is, to show the inexistence of non-bossy rules on F n apart from constant ones. Next we show that any rule on the single-plateaued domain with #A f 2 is bossy, it violates Maskin monotonicity, and furthermore, constant rules are the only ones satisfying both strategy-proofness and quasi non-bossiness on F n .
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Let f be a non-bossy social choice function on F n with #A f 2. Note that by de…nition of f as a social choice function, given u 2
. By Claim 1, both kinds of option sets are singletons. Thus, in order that f be well-de…ned, given u 2 F n , f (u) = o(u i ) = o(u i ) for any i 2 N . This means that f is a constant function, i.e. for any u 2
(ii) Let f be a Maskin monotonic social choice function on F n with #A f 2. Let A f fx; yg, where x 6 = y. Let u; v 2 F n be such that f (u) = x and f (v) = y. Without loss of generality suppose that x < y. Let w 2 F n , be such that for
Repeating the same argument for any agent i 2 N; we obtain that f (w) = f (u). Similarly, f (w) = f (v). This implies that x = y, a contradiction. (iii) It is straightforward by part (ii), Lemma 2 above and the fact that Property L implies Maskin monotonicity, as previously noted.
We now show that counterpart result of Theorem 2 for F n . Concretely, on F n , strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness are equivalent to weak Maskin monotonicity.
Proof of Theorem 3. We …rst show that any strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy social choice function on F n is weakly Maskin monotonic. Let i 2 N , u i ; v i 2 F, and u i 2 F n 1 be such that for all x 2 A, such that
and by the condition in weak Maskin monotonicity letting x = f (v i ; u i ), we have that
We now show that if f is weakly Maskin monotonic then it is weakly non-bossy and strategy-proof. To show weak non-bossiness, consider i 2 N , u i , v i 2 F, and u i 2 F n 1 such that v i (f (v i ; u i )) = v i (f (u)) and u i (f (u)) = u i (f (v i ; u i )). If for any x 2 A, u i (f (u)) = u i (x) implies v i (f (u)) v i (x) and u i (f (u)) > u i (x) implies v i (f (u)) > v i (x) or else for any x 2 A, v i (f (u)) = v i (x) implies u i (f (u)) u i (x) and v i (f (u)) > v i (x) implies u i (f (u)) > u i (x), then by weak Maskin monotonicity we get that f (v i ; u i ) = f (u). Otherwise, let w i 2 F such that (w i ) = [minff (u); f (v i ; u i )g; maxff (u); f (v i ; u i )g]. Then, by weak Maskin monotonicity applied to [u; (w i ; u i )] and also to [(v i ; u i ); (w i ; u i )] we have both that f (w i ; u i ) = f (u) and f (w i ; u i ) = f (v i ; u i ). Thus, since f is a social choice function f (u) = f (v i ; u i ). Finally, suppose that f is not strategy-proof. Then, there exists i 2 N , u i ; v i 2 F, and u i 2 F n 1 such that u i (f (v i ; u i )) > u i (f (u)). Let, without loss of generality, f (v i ; u i ) > f (u). Note that f (v i ; u i ) 2 (f (u); r ui (f (u))) or else f (v i ; u i ) 2 (f (u); 1] if there is no x > p + (u i ) such that u i (f (u)) = u i (x). Let w i 2 S, be such that p(w i ) = f (v i ; u i ) and w i (f (u)) = w i (r ui (f (u))). Note that the following holds: if u i (f (u)) = u i (x) then w i (f (u)) > w i (x) and if u i (f (u)) > u i (x) then w i (f (u)) > w i (x). Then, by weak Maskin monotonicity, f (w i ; u i ) = f (u). Since p(w i ) = f (v i ; u i ), we have that if v i (f (v i ; u i )) = v i (x) then w i (f (v i ; u i )) > w i (x) and if v i (f (v i ; u i )) > u i (x) then w i (f (v i ; u i )) > w i (x). Again, by weak Maskin monotonicity, f (v i ; u i ) = f (w i ; u i ) and we get a contradiction.
Finally, in the next proof we show that for social choice functions on F n , strategy-proofness and plateau-invariance imply both weak non-bossiness and convex range.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let f be a strategy-proof and plateau-invariant social choice function on F n . Let us show that f satis…es weak non-bossiness. Thus, let u 2 F n , i 2 N , v i 2 F such that u i (f (u)) = u i (f (v i ; u i )) (A1) and v i (f (u)) = v i (f (v i ; u i )) (A2) but f (u) 6 = f (v i ; u i ). Without loss of generality, suppose that f (u) < f (v i ; u i ). Distinguish the following three cases (A, B and C). Case A: f (u), f (v i ; u i ) = 2 (u i ) and f (u), f (v i ; u i ) = 2 (v i ). First note that by (A1) and (A2), (u i ); (v i ) (f (u); f (v i ; u i )). Let ! i 2 F such that p (! i ) = f (u) and p + (! i ) = f (v i ; u i ). By strategy-proofness, f (! i ; u i ) 2 ff (u); f (v i ; u i )g (otherwise, either i would manipulate f at u via ! i , or i would manipulate f at (! i ; u i ) via u i ). Suppose that f (! i ; u i ) = f (u) (a similar argument would work for f (! i ; u i ) = f (v i ; u i )). Let v i 2 F such that (v i ) = [p (v i ); f (v i ; u i )]. By strategy-proofness, f (v i ; u i ) 2 (v i ) (otherwise, agent i would manipulate f at (v i ; u i ) via v i ). Moreover, also by strategy-proofness, f (v i ; u i ) = f (v i ; u i ) (otherwise, agent i would manipulate f at (v i ; u i ) via v i ). By plateau-invariance, f (v i ; u i ) = f (! i ; u i ) = f (u) which is the desired contradiction. Case B: f (u), f (v i ; u i ) 2 (u i ) and f (u), f (v i ; u i ) 2 (v i ). Without loss of generality, suppose that f (u) < f (v i ; u i ). Consider the following subcases:
Note that for cases 1 to 4 we obtain that f (u) = f (v i ; u i ) straightforwardly by plateau-invariance. For case 5, de…ne ! i 2 F such that (! i ) = [p (u i ); p + (v i )]. By plateau-invariance, we obtain both that f (! i ; u i ) = f (u) and f (! i ; u i ) = f (v i ; u i ) which means that f (u) = f (v i ; u i ). Case C (identical argument to Case A): f (u), f (v i ; u i ) 2 (u i ) and f (u), f (v i ; u i ) = 2 (v i ) (a similar argument would follow if f (u), f (v i ; u i ) = 2 (u i ) and f (u), f (v i ; u i ) 2 (v i )). First note that by (A2), (v i ) (f (u); f (v i ; u i )). Let ! i 2 F such that (! i ) = [f (u); f (v i ; u i )]. By plateau-invariance, f (! i ; u i ) = f (u). Let ! (ii) Note that weak Maskin monotonicity is straightforward by part (i) and Theorem 3. (iii) Let f be a strategy-proof and plateau-invariant social choice function on F n . We now show that f has convex range. By contradiction suppose that there exist x; y 2 A f , x < y, such that (x; y) AnA f . Let u; v 2 F n such that f (u) = x and f (v) = y. Let w i 2 F be such that (w i ) = [f (u); f (v)] and w
